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Multiscalar institutional
complementarity and the scaling of
clusters
Complementarité institutionnelle multiscalaire et échelle des clusters
Pieter Terhorst
1 It is widely agreed that the form of capitalism has changed over the last three decades.
To  use  the  labels  of  similar  but  nevertheless  different  theories,  there  has  been  a
transformation  from  fordism  to  post-fordism,  from  mass  production  to  flexible
specialisation or from a Keynesian welfare state to a Schumpeterian workfare state.
According to the glocalisation thesis (Swyngedouw, 2000 and 2004), this broad political-
economic transformation has been accompanied with a rescaling of the economy and
the state. The local and the global have become the most important levels of economic
and political  action while  the national  level  has declined in importance.  The world
economy is no longer fuelled by national economies and national states but by urban
and regional  economies  and their  concomitant  (in)formal  institutions of  urban and
regional  economic  governance  on  the  one  hand  and  by  global  economic  processes
(international trade, financial flows, global companies, foreign direct investments, and
international  strategic  alliances)  and  supra-national  political  organizations  on  the
other. Rescaling is not just a “by-product” of the above-mentioned political-economic
transformation but  an  integral  part  of  it  because  it  is  simultaneously  medium and
outcome of the latter. 
2 The  voluminous  new-economic-regionalism  literature  of  the  1990s,  be  it  industrial
districts,  clusters,  new industrial spaces, innovative milieux and learning regions, is
broadly in line with the glocalisation thesis.  It  says that the place-bound assets for
global  competitiveness  are  no  longer  national  but  regional.  Because  it  equates
globalisation with a rising dominance of global markets (it largely ignores non-market
modes of economic coordination at the global level), it focuses almost exclusively on
those place-bound assets of cities and regions that are hard to imitate elsewhere. That
is why it strongly gazes at the region while ignoring other spatial levels. In most of the
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literature on new economic regionalism, spatial clusters are defined in relatively self-
contained  terms,  with  little  attention  paid  to  how  inter-firm  relations  and  the
(in)formal regulatory institutional framework in which they are embedded are scaled. 
3 Over the last five years or so, however, there has been a growing attention to how
clusters are scaled. It  has been shown that clusters are simultaneously governed by
non-market modes of economic coordination at the global level, such as hierarchies,
networks, and even communities. It is now increasingly argued that the latter modes of
global economic coordination, networks in particular, are at least equally, if not more,
important for well  functioning clusters as regional ones.  Thus a more sophisticated
version of new economic regionalism says that regional and global modes of economic
coordination  complement  each  other,  which  is  why  the  assets  for  regional
competitiveness are simultaneously both regional and global. But this is even better in
tune with the glocalisation thesis because its view regarding the global and the local is
more balanced. 
4 Although the glocalisation thesis and its closely related literature on new economic
regionalism is very attractive and has inspired my research, I feel dissatisfied with it
because it is too much downplaying the national level and hardly has an open eye to
dissimilar or divergent trajectories of glocalisation. The glocalisation thesis implicitly
assumes  that  all  countries  have  followed  more  or  less  the  same  trajectory  from  a
nationally  embedded fordism towards  a  glocalised  post-fordism.  It  does  hardly  pay
attention to varieties of glocalisation. No wonder that it largely ignores the variety-of-
capitalism thesis that claims a persistent continuity or, more precisely, a strong path
dependency of different national forms of capitalism and different national forms of the
state in the era of globalisation. Nor that it largely disregards how spatial clusters are
intertwined  with  national  forms  of  capitalism  and  national  forms  of  the  state.
According to the variety-of-capitalism thesis, national forms of capitalism and national
forms of the state show a strong path dependence because there is a strong coherence
or institutional  complementarity in different spheres of  economic and political  life.
Although institutional complementarity has different meanings (as we shall see later),
in the economist’s sense it comes down to the fact that the presence of one institution
increases the returns or efficiency of the other. 
5 In the literature on new economic regionalism, one can find plenty of  examples of
“horizontal” institutional complementarity, although the term is never explicitly used
here. The idea that different institutions at the regional level complement each other
and form a coherent regional whole that is more than the sum of its parts, runs as a red
line through this literature. But it largely ignores a “vertical” complementarity of local
and national institutions. Adherents of the variety-of-capitalism thesis, on the other
hand,  stress  a  “horizontal”  institutional  complementarity  at  the  national  level  but,
being blind to geography, ignore a “vertical” institutional complementarity between
the national and local level. In this paper I aim to bridge both bodies of literature and
to  explore  the  “vertical”  institutional  complementarity  between  national  forms  of
capitalism  and  spatial  clusters.  I  do  this  because  I  have  the  feeling  that  this  is  a
promising way to get a better grip on the (re)scaling of clusters. 
6 My paper is organised as follows. In the first section I say no more than a few words on
the  literature  of  new economic  regionalism followed  by  arguments  why  the  scalar
perspective  on  clusters  is  changing.  There  is  growing recognition  that  clusters  are
embedded in a broader institutional matrix at national and supra-national levels, and
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economic geographers are increasingly stressing the relational character of scale. In
the third section I discuss the variety-of-capitalism thesis followed by a discussion of
institutional complementarity. To give my arguments flesh and blood, I present a case
study of the Dutch vegetables-under-glass cluster in the final section. It is an example
of strong institutional complementarity between the local and national level because
the cluster is  tightly interwoven with national  corporatist  institutions.  By this  case
study I do not want to suggest that all Dutch clusters are so closely intertwined with
national corporatist institutions. They are not.  The “coupling” of national and local
institutions can vary even within one country. In short, there is variety within variety
and  Swyngedouw’s  glocalisation  thesis  should  be  reformulated  into  a  “variety  of
glocalisation thesis” that reflects the varying role of the national level. 
 
Monopolies of Place and New Economic Regionalism 
7 We hear it almost every day. “In the era of globalisation, there are no alternatives to
free markets ; all alternatives lead to economic stagnation”. At first look it just seems a
matter of common sense but it is in fact much more. It is the kernel of neoclassical
economics and liberal political theory that equates perfectly competitive markets with
economic  growth  and  the  rise  and  spread  of  global  capitalism  with  a  successful
introduction of perfectly competitive markets. 
8 Schumpeter (see Clemence and Doody, 1966) and Braudel (1982) have radically inverted
the  conventional  wisdom  that equates  the  rise  and  spread  of  capitalism  with  the
successful  establishment  of  markets,  and  market  competition  with  the  motor  of
economic growth. Capitalism, they argue, is inherently anti-market. No capitalist wants
to operate in fully competitive markets because that is not where the biggest profits are
made. They are made in monopolies or oligopolies. That is why the spur for economic
change is not market competition but how to keep out of such competition. Historical
capitalism  is,  for  Braudel,  a  world  of  multi  monopolies,  not  multiple  markets.
Schumpeter’s view on capitalist  dynamics is  very similar.  Real entrepreneurs try to
escape from competitive markets through innovations or so-called “new combinations”
1.  New  combinations  are  not  only  the  outcome  of  the  actions  of  heroic  private
entrepreneurs, as was thought by Schumpeter (in his early works), but also the result of
collective action and non-market coordination. In other words, not only firms but also
national  states,  regions  and cities  try  to  escape  from fully  competitive  markets  by
making  new  combinations.  True,  national  states  are  very  active  in  creating  fully
competitive markets at the national, European, and global level but, contradictorily,
attempt  simultaneously  to  get  away  from  them  by  creating  national  competitive
advantages that cannot be easily imitated elsewhere (for instance, the Dutch mainport
policy, the Finnish innovation policy and the Swiss banking policy). The same applies to
cities and regions that, in response to ever increasing European and global competition,
try to create monopolies of place that are hard to imitate. 
9 Although such  strategies  are  followed at  the  national  and  regional  level,  the  new-
economic-regionalism  theory  of  the  1990s  stresses  the  growing  political  economic
importance of the region in the global era. The theory of new economic regionalism is
not really one theory but rather a collection of partial approaches with different labels :
flexible specialization and industrial districts (Amin, 2000 ; Beccattini et al., 2003 ; Sabel,
1994),  clusters (Porter,  2000),  new industrial  spaces (Scott,  1988,  1998),  the regional
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world (Storper, 1997), innovative milieus (Camagni, 1991), regional innovation systems
(Braczyk et  al.,  1998),  and learning regions (Cooke and Morgan, 1998 ;  Cooke,  2002).
Notwithstanding their subtle and, in some cases, large differences of these approaches
(Porter deviates most from the others), they all agree with Allen Scott’s (1996) catchy
phrase that “the regions are the motors of the world economy”, which are based on the
following arguments. 
 
Flexible specialization and transaction costs 
10 The political-economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s in Wetsren Europe and the US as
well  as  Europeanisation  and  globalisation  have  stimulated  the  rise  of  flexibly
specialized production systems and has forced horizontally and vertically integrated
firms  to  externalize  their  production.  In  addition,  new  economic  activities  in  the
sphere of business services, ICT, media and culture have appeared on the economic
scene accompanied with the establishment of new small firms that are very dependent
on  an  urban  environment.  All  this  stimulates  spatial  clustering  because  it  reduces
transaction  costs  between  firms,  particularly  in  case  of  irregular,  unpredictable  or
complex  transactions.  These  transaction  costs  are  not  so  much  related  to  traded
interdependencies (physical input-output relations) as to untraded interdependencies
(all non-market transactions and relations between firms).
 
New mixes of modes of economic coordination 
11 All  theorists  of  new  economic  regionalism  (except  Porter)  share  the  institutional
economic starting point that economies are governed by mixtures of various modes of
economic  coordination :  markets,  hierarchies,  associations,  communities,  networks,
and the state (see for more Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997 and Crouch, 2004). While
hierarchies  and the  state  (and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  associations)  were  the  dominant
modes of economic coordination in the fordist era, we see a growing importance of
mixtures of markets, communities, and networks (and, to a lesser extent, associations)
in the glocalised post-fordist era. A spatial clustering of similar firms stimulates market
competition (particularly Porter emphasizes this point). But spatial clusters can only be
successful  in  the  global  economy  if  markets  are  combined  with  networks  and
communities. And it is precisely the latter that are much more localized than other
modes of coordination. 
 
Innovation processes according to interactive model of innovation
12 Were fordist economies driven by cost reduction through mass production, post-fordist
economies  are  propelled  by  innovation.  Innovation  is  much  more  than  radical
innovations  and  high-tech.  Also  “traditional”,  low-tech  industries  can  be  very
innovative,  be  it  by  means  of  incremental  innovations.  In  addition,  innovation
processes  are no longer based on the so-called linear  model  of  innovation (the lab
invents a new product that subsequently is produced in the production department and
finally  put  on  the  market  by  the  marketing  department)  but  on  the  so-called
interactive model of innovation, in which there is all the time feedback between all
actors involved inside and, more importantly, outside the firm. And it is precisely these
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innovation processes along the interactive model that are much more localized than
those along the linear model. 
 
New forms of spatial clustering based on local circulation of tacit
knowledge and local buzz
13 The rise of new forms of clustering is based on pools of specialized workers and firms
that are the “hot spots” of specialized knowledge. Because specialized knowledge is
becoming increasingly codified and more widely accessible (internet), the competitive
position of regions is increasingly based on the local circulation of tacit knowledge and
local buzz (Storper en Venables, 2004), that is to say : on the circulation of non-codified
knowledge that can only be learned by doing and only picked up by “being there”
(Gertler, 1995). For tacit knowledge and local buzz circulate most easily through face-to-
face interaction between actors that speak the same language, use the same codes of
behaviour and communication, adhere to the same conventions and norms, and know
each other on the basis of an informal contact or an earlier successful cooperation. 
 
Innovation and learning supported by regional coalitions
14 Innovation  and  learning  are  processes  of  collective  action  that  are  supported  by
coalitions of private and public actors. The state no longer plays a dominant role in it
but is at best a primus inter pares. Due to an increasing regionalization of the economy
and a  devolution of  state  power  to  the  regional  level,  innovation and learning are
increasingly supported by regional alliances of businesses, trade unions, universities
and research institutes, vocational training colleges, economic development agencies,
and local governments among others.
 
Growing industrial specialization of regions
15 The  tendency  towards  clustering  in  learning  regions  is  accompanied  by  a  growing
spatial specialization of industrial sectors (at four or five digit level). In other words,
localisation  economies  are  becoming  ever  more  important  and  the  growing
specialization  of  national  exports  are  increasingly  based  on  so-called  “technology
districts” (Storper, 1997, pp. 195-220). 
 
Path-dependent development
16 Economic  regionalization  is  always  a  matter  of  long-term  processes.  It  is  a  path-
dependent development process but due to a very well-developed regional division of
labour between firms the risk of lock-in is much smaller than in corporate hierarchies.
 
From Regional Gaze to Scaling of Clusters 
17 By hammering at the point that competitive advantages are no longer found in national
states but in the regions, the adherents of the theory of new economic regionalism
seem to have become obsessed by the region : “a regional gaze” (Lagendijk, 2002). No
wonder  that  it  is  mostly  assumed  that  clusters  of  similar  and  related  industries,
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networks of competing as well as collaborating firms, labour markets for specialised
skills, external economies of scale and scope, low transaction costs, circulation of non-
ubiquitous (tacit) knowledge, trust and (in)formal institutions of economic governance
are all found at the regional level. Little attention is paid to how inter-firm relations
and the (in)formal regulatory institutional framework in which they are embedded are
scaled. 
18 While much of the above-mentioned literature focuses predominantly on the influence
of regional factors on cluster development, there is, however, a growing attention to the
scaling of clusters and a growing recognition that clusters are embedded in a broader
institutional matrix at supra-regional levels. This changing perspective is based on the
following arguments.
 
Localisation and urbanisation economies can be diffuse 
19 Although the scale of Italian industrial districts – the paradigmatic example of flexible
specialisation – can be fairly simply demarcated by the “daily urban system” of the
actors  because  they  are  strongly  embedded  in  their  local  communities  (a  key
characteristic of these districts), all other approaches deal with geographic proximity
in very loose way. Porter is going farthest in this respect. The scale of his clusters can
vary from a neighbourhood to a number of adjacent countries (for instance, Toulouse’s
Airbus cluster includes northern Germany and parts of the UK). That is the reason why
Malmberg (2003, p. 151) proposes to leave out geographic proximity altogether from
the definition of a cluster and to limit the term to a non-spatial “industry cluster”, i.e. a
set of functionally linked economic activities (cf. Perroux’s espace economique), and to
make  degrees  of  agglomeration an  attribute  of  such a  cluster  rather  than part  of  its
definition. Phelps (2004), in the same vein, argues for an “economic geography of the
banal” that pays attention to diffuse forms of  external economies and agglomerative
effects.
 
Importance of extra-regional networks
20 In the theory of new economic regionalism it is often assumed that spatial clustering is
strongly, if not exclusively, based on regional networks (and communities). And these
place-bound networks play a key role in the competitive advantage of regions in global
markets. In other words, non-market modes of economic coordination are particularly
found at the regional level while the market mode of economic coordination dominates
at the global level. In doing so, it overlooks the fact that spatial clustering is based on
other mechanisms than regional networks, such as presented in the “classical model of
pure agglomeration” in which economic actors are anonymous, and in the “model of
industrial complexes” (Gordon and McCann, 2000). In addition, and more importantly,
the scale of clustered firms does not necessarily coincide with that of networks. In most
cases  it  does  not.  And  non-market  modes  of  economic  coordination  can  be  very
important  at  the  global  level.  A  large  number  of  authors  (Amin  and  Thrift,  2002,
pp. 51-77 ;  Bathelt  et  al.,  2004 ;  Bunnell  and  Coe,  2002 ;  Clark  and  Tracey,  2004,
pp. 84-89 ;  Isaksen,  2005 ;  Lagendijk,  2004 ;  Oinas  and  Malecki,  2002 ;  Simmie,  2004,
Sturgeon, 2004 ; Wolfe and Gertler, 2004) show that the extra-regional, i.e. national and
particularly global, non-market relations of firms are equally, if not more, important
for the competitiveness of firms, particularly with respect to innovation and learning,
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as  intra-regional  ones.  Even  the  commonly  consented  idea  that  tacit  knowledge
circulates only locally is being challenged. Gertler (2003, pp. 105-109) discusses a recent
body  of  work  based  on  concepts  of  “microcommunities  of  knowledge”  and
“communities of practice”, which shows that dense communities of people can develop
around a certain trade or profession and such communities can develop relations of
trust and shared cognitions that allow for the sharing of tacit knowledge, despite being
globally dispersed. Thus according to this approach the relational proximity of some
groups of professionals is much more important for the circulation of tacit knowledge
than geographical proximity. 
 
National context still very important for transnational corporations 
21 The national level still is very important for the globalisation strategy of transnational
corporations  (Gertler,  2003).  In  addition,  studies  on  so-called  transplant  geography
point out that branches of transnational companies have to adapt themselves strongly
to their host countries, i.e. to their national institutional context, regarding their daily
practices as well as their long-term strategies (Gertler, 1995 ; Schoenberger, 1999). 
 
New perspectives on scale and (re-)scaling
22 Geographers  traditionally  conceive  scale  in  terms of  size  of  a  delineated  area  or  a
hierarchy of  delineated areas like in Christaller’s  theory of  central  places or in the
territorial organization of national states. And traditionally social scientists, including
geographers of course, have a “zero-sum conception of scale” (Brenner, 2000, p. 364),
i.e. the notion that scales operate as mutually exclusive rather than as co-constitutive
territorial  frameworks  for  social  relations.  The  traditional  intellectual  division  of
labour is based on such a “zero-sum conception of scale” : economics, sociology, and
political science is about (national) societies while geography about cities and regions.
That is why social scientists are by tradition inclined to limit their research to one scale
only,  and  they  seldom  focus  on  several  scales  simultaneously.  Over  the  last  two
decades, however, a lot of literature on scale and (re-)scaling has been published that
conceives scale or, more precisely, scaling in a radically different way (see for overview
of  this  voluminous  literature  Herod,  2003  and  Mamadouh,  2004).  In  this  new
perspective the relational character of scale is  stressed, which means that different
scales constitute each other. The global constitutes the local and the local constitutes
the global. And the relations between scales are neither priori given nor are they fixed
but  are  actively  (re)produced  all  the  time.  Relations  between  scales  are  object  of
societal and political struggle, which is why they are changing in time. Since scale is
conceived in dynamic terms, the term (re)scaling is preferred to scale. According to this
“scalar” perspective, no theoretical priority can be given to one particular geographical
scale  since  the  process  through  which  particular  scales  become  constituted  and
subsequently transformed is an object of research in itself.  Research on scaling, for
instance the scaling of clusters, should, therefore, not so much be focused on defining
which relations are exclusively local and which are exclusively global but as how global
and local relations are interwoven and how both local and global relations are modified
by the specific way they are intertwined. 
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23 The above-mentioned studies that show how global and local relations are intertwined
are  a  good  example  of  this  new  scalar  perspective.  This  even  more  applies  to
Swyngedouw’s (1997 en 2000) glocalisation thesis that is completely integrated with
this perspective. No surprise because he is one of its founding fathers. The fact that the
national level is downplayed in the glocalisation thesis does not necessarily result from
a relational approach to scale. The national level can very well play an important role
next to other levels, as has been argued by Boyer en Rogers Hollingsworth (1997). In
other words, spatial clusters are not only made up of mixtures of regional and global
modes of economic coordination but of national ones as well. And the latter can vary
significantly between national states. This brings me to the variety-of-capitalism thesis.
 
Variety of capitalism and multi-scalar institutional
complementarity
24 Over the last decade a growing amount of literature on the variety-of-capitalism thesis
has been published (Amable, 2003 ; Boyer, 2003 ; Coates, 2005 ; Crouch, 2005 ; Hall and
Soskice, 2001 ; Rogers Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997 ; Soskice, 1999 ; Kitschelt et al.,
1999 and Whitley, 1999). Contrary to what the glocalisation thesis and the theory of
new economic regionalism say, adherents of the variety-of-capitalism thesis stress a
persistent continuity of different national forms of capitalism in the era of globalisation.
The variety-of-capitalism thesis can be roughly summarised in three points.
 
Political-economic institutions in different spheres of action form a
coherent whole
25 Political-economic  institutions  in  the  sphere  of  capital-labour  relations,  vocational
training and education, corporate governance, financial system, inter-firm relations,
and  social  protection  form  a  coherent  whole.  There  is  a  complementarity  of
institutions.  For  instance,  the  emphasis  on  short-term  strategies  in  the  financial
relationship between the firm and financial markets in US-capitalism is complementary
to a non-commitment of the firm towards its employees, as a consequence of which
workers  are  reluctant  to  invest  in  firm-specific  skills.  The  concept  of  institutional
complementarity  plays  a  key  role  in  the  variety-of-capitalism  thesis  (just  as  in
regulation  theory)  and  is  conceived  in  different  ways.  Crouch  (2005,  pp. 46-73)
distinguishes three different types of institutional complementarity. 
Institutions cohere through a logic of similarity. Institutions with similar properties are found
together as actors adopt similar approaches or institutional solutions to different spheres of
action. For instance, Dutch political elites applied the same principles they used to pacify
conflicts in the religious sphere (pillarisation) to conflicts in the political-economic sphere
(corporatism). 
The second form is an opposed logic of complementarity in which one institution makes up for
the  deficiencies of  the  other.  In  doing  so,  it  raises  the  returns  to  actors  from  the  first
institution. For example, when strong familial social support networks offset the vicissitudes
of a highly liberalised labour market. In such a case, the existence of the former makes the
latter more socially and politically acceptable, thus allowing society to gain the advantages
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The third form of institutional complementarity lies at the heart of most theories of variety
of capitalism : logic of synergy or complementarity in the economist’s sense.
26 According to Amable (2003, pp. 54-73), whose view is close to that of the regulation
school,  institutional  complementarity  means  that  one  institutional  form makes  the
other institutional form more efficient. And the change of one institutional form in one
area leads to the change of an institutional form in another area. All this does not imply
that all institutions are equally important for the structure of complementarity. Some
institutions  are  more  important  for  it  than  are  others,  which  is  why  there  is
simultaneously a hierarchy of institutions. In some countries, for instance, the capital-
labour compromise has dominated all  other institutional forms for a long time and
nowadays it is argued that a financialisation of the economy is the driving force behind
all other institutional changes. 
27 It is the complementarity and the hierarchy of institutions that explain the variety of
capitalism. 
 
Hardly any convergence of national forms of capitalism in the era of
globalisation
28 Due to institutional complementarity, social systems of production change only slowly
and their development path is highly path dependent. That is why there is hardly any
convergence of different forms of capitalism in the era of globalisation. In addition, and
more  importantly,  each  specific  national  institutional  configuration  provides  a
comparative  advantage  to  certain  economic  activities  and  stimulates  a  specific
economic  specialization.  And  this  specialization  reinforces  each  specific  national
institutional  configuration.  For  instance,  Germany’s  education  and  industrial
institutions,  such as the dual  apprenticeship system, its  specific  management-union
cooperation in the definition of required skills, together with a corporate-governance
system based on close ties with banks supplying “patient” capital, have encouraged the
growth of competitiveness in industries where technology diffusion and workers’ skills
matters  most :  quality-sensitive,  engineering-intensive  industries  such  as  advanced
machine tools, luxury cars and specialist chemicals. 
29 Some adherents of the variety-of-capitalism thesis simply distinguish liberal market
economies from coordinated market economies (see,  for  instance,  Hall  and Soskice,
2001) but others use much more refined typologies. Whitley (1999) distinguishes, on
theoretical grounds,  six  ideal  types  of  business  system  (fragmented,  coordinated,
compartmentalised, state organized, collaborative and highly coordinated) on the basis
of ownership integration, alliance forms of coordination, owner control type, firm size
and intersectoral coordination. These different kinds of business system are generated
and  reproduced  by  a  number  of  key  institutions  such  as  the  state  (kind  of  state-
industry relations), the financial system (capital market of credit based), capital-labour
relations, and trust and authority relations. Because these different institutions have
co-evolved with business-system characteristics in course of time, they all form, to a
large extent, a coherent whole. Amable’s (2003) typology is based on empirical grounds,
not on ideal types. He collected quantitative data on a vast range of characteristics of
the  national  economies  of  most  OECD  countries :  product-market  competition,  the
wage-labour nexus and labour-market institutions, the financial intermediation sector
and corporate governance, social  protection, and the education sector.  And he uses
• 
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dozens of individual indicators to assess each. On the basis of these empirical data he
constructs a typology of groups of countries. This procedure gives him five types of
capitalism :  market  based  (primarily  Anglophone),  social-democratic  (Nordic),  Asian
(Japan  and  Korea),  Mediterranean  (Italy,  Spain,  and  Portugal)  and  Continental
European. The latter group of countries does not show much internal coherence. The
Netherlands  and Switzerland form a  specific  subset  that  is  in-between the market-
based model and the social-democratic model. These different types of capitalism are,
too a large extent, shaped by a left-right differentiation and institutional features of
political  systems,  such  as  the  “Westminster  model  of  democracy”  versus
“consociational democracy”, and the number and power of veto-players. 
30 At first look it does not seem to be important whether different forms of capitalism are
distinguished on the basis of ideal types or empirical research. But it is very important
because  the  ideal-typical  approach  is  much  more  open  to  the  possibility  that  one
specific national form of capitalism can consist of a mixture of two or more ideal types.
In other words, it is more open to hybrid cases and admits that there is variety within
variety. For instance, Whitley’s (1999) ideal typical distinction between a “fragmented”
and a “compartmentalised” model, which is dominated by large firms, enables him to
see the US as a hybrid case of two different forms of capitalism (just as the German
form  in  the  Ruhr  area  strongly  differs  from  that  in  Baden-Württemberg)  while  in
Amable’s (2003) typology the US is market based only. That is why the latter author is
forced to  see  the American “military industrial  complex” as  an example of  market
based capitalism, which obviously is not. The fundamental point is, as Crouch (2005)
argues, that empirical cases must be studied, not to determine to which of a number of
theoretical types they should be allocated, but to determine which of these ideal types
are to be found within them, in roughly what proportions, and with what change over
time. 
31 The fact that individual cases might well compromise more amalgams of elements from
two  or  more  theoretical  types  undermines,  to  some  extent,  the  logic-of-synergy
argument,  i.e.  that  all  institutions  of  a  specific  national  form  of  capitalism  are
institutionally complementary to each other. Many authors admit that that the degree
of institutional complementarity between as well as within different subsystems can
vary from loose integration to tight integration (or from a tight fit to a loose coupling).
However, the logic-of-synergy interpretation of institutional complementarity does not
allow for a too loose coupling because it undermines the efficiency of institutions. This
implies that “pure” cases perform better than mixed types. For instance, Calmfors and
Driffill (1988) found in their now widely known study that that inflation was lower in
countries  with  either  highly  centralised  collective wage  bargaining  or  completely
unorganised labour markets. Mixtures in between these extreme types produced much
higher inflation. 
32 The adherents of the variety-of-capitalism thesis are largely blind to geography. They
implicitly  assume that  only  sets  of  complementary institutions at  the national level
produce variety of capitalisms. But why not sets of national and regional institutions ?
Why is not more attention paid to how national forms of capitalism or business systems
are scaled ? And why are clusters and the way they are scaled not an integral part of
business systems ? It is only very recently that adherents of the variety-of-capitalism
thesis  have  begun to  questioning  how national  business  systems  are.  For  instance,
Whitley (2005) argues that business systems in so-called “business corporatist” states
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(Japan  comes  close  to  this  ideal  type)  and  “inclusive  corporatist”  states  (the
Netherlands comes close to this ideal type) are much more national than in “arm’s
length states” (the US comes close to this ideal type) and in “dominant developmental
states”  (South  Korea  since  1961  or  France  up  to  the  1980s  with  a  huge  variation
between sectors). Thus in the former two ideal types business systems are much more
nationally  specific  and  homogeneous  with  similar  characteristics  throughout  the
country and across all sectors. 
33 The fact that business systems in some forms of the state are more national than they
are  in  others  makes  it  highly  likely  that  there  is  variety  in  the  way  clusters  are
intertwined with them. In countries that come close to the ideal type of a “business
corporatist”, and an “inclusive corporatist” state, it is highly likely that spatial clusters
are much more interwoven with the national business system than in the “arm’s length
state”.  More precisely,  the “vertical” institutional  complementarity (in the sense of
logic of complementarity and logic of synergy) in the former two is much stronger than
in the latter. In the “dominant developmental state” clusters (in a functional as well as
spatial sense) that are the spearheads of the national state also show a strong “vertical”
institutional complementarity while this is much less the case in other clusters. 
34 In analysing varieties of “vertical” institutional complementarity, it is again important
to realise whether different forms of national capitalism are distinguished on empirical
data or on ideal types. In the former a strong overall institutional complementarity is
assumed,  which  implies  that  different  types  of  clusters  are  institutionally
complementary to the national form. For instance, 
The  combination  of  “patient  capital”  and  intra-firm  learning  in  Germany  makes  “job
hopping” as a mechanism for the circulation of knowledge in German clusters much less
important than in American ones.
Venture capitalists are much more important in American clusters than in German ones
because they make up for the deficiencies for a “bank based” financial system.
Local inter-firm  relations  are  much  less  important in  Dutch  clusters  because  they  are
regulated ny national corporatist institutions. 
35 However, if one starts from ideal types of national forms of capitalism, then it is highly
likely that  the national  form of  a  specific  country is  an amalgam of  different ideal
types.  In that  case,  there is  much more variety within variety,  including variety of
“vertical” institutional complementarity. This is, to some extent, an advantage to the
researcher because it legitimises him or her to study a specific country without being
astonished  that  some  cluster  are  tightly  interwoven  with  the  national  level  while
others are not. The case study of the Dutch vegetables-under-glass cluster (see next
section) is an example of the former. But this does not imply that all Dutch clusters are
scaled  in  the  same  way.  They  are  not.  The  Rotterdam  architectural  cluster
(Kloosterman and Stegmeijer, 2005) and the Amsterdam television advertisment cluster
(Knuivers, 2006) are fairly loosely coupled to the national business system. In addition,
it seems that the Amsterdam financial cluster is becoming decoupled from the national
institutional context (Engelen, 2007). In sum, there are not only varieties of capitalism
but also varieties of glocalisation (Van der Heiden and Terhorst, 2007). 
36 Given the fact that not only the degree of horizontal institutional complementarity at
the  national  level  can  vary  but  also  the  integration  of  clusters  with  the  national
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Figure 1. Degree of institutional complementarity at the national level.
37 The following case is an example of cell 1 in the above-mentioned typology. 
 
Multiscalar institutional complementarity of the Dutch
vegetables-under-glass cluster
38 The Netherlands is one of the most urbanised countries in Europe. Yet, paradoxically,
Dutch  export  performance  is  relatively  strongest  in  agricultural  products.  Dutch
comparative  advantage  as  measured  by  the  Balassa-index2 is  since  long  by  far  the
highest for flowers (20.1). Indeed, Dutch flowers are world famous and define, to a large
extent,  Dutch  image  abroad.  Much  less  known,  however,  is  the  strong  export
performance of Dutch vegetables. The Balassa index for the latter may well be lower
than  that  for  flowers  but  is  still  very  high  (12.1).  And,  strikingly,  the  export
performance of vegetables has increased most during the 1990s (Hinloopen and Van
Marrewijk, 1999). A closer look at the export mix of the latter shows that only three
products  dominate :  sweet  peppers,  tomatoes,  and  cucumbers  that  make  up  about
seventy percent of all exports of vegetables and show very high Balassa-indexes. The
Dutch share  in  world  trade  in  2002  was  around 3.5  percent  against  15  percent  for
tomatoes,  17  percent  for  sweet  peppers,  and  27  percent  for  cucumbers.  The
Netherlands is the second-largest world exporter of cucumbers after Mexico, and is the
third largest one of sweet peppers and tomatoes after Spain and Mexico. Germany and,
to a lesser extent, Great Britain are by far the most important export markets for Dutch
vegetables.  This  strong  export  performance  is  based  on  tremendously  high
productivities per hectare, which are by far the highest in the world. Dutch growers
produce eleven times more cucumbers and six times more sweet peppers and tomatoes
per  hectare  than  their  Spanish  competitors  (Kwantitatieve  Informatie  voor  de
Glastuintuinbouw,  2001-2002).  All  Dutch cucumbers,  sweet peppers,  and tomatoes are
produced under glass, which is a condition sine qua non for the high land productivity.
That  is  why  the  vegetable-under-glass  industry  looks  more  like  a  manufacturing
industry  than  agriculture,  and  fits  well  in  a  highly  urbanised  country.  The  above-
mentioned paradox that the comparative advantage of one of most urbanised countries
in Europe is the strongest in agricultural products is in accordance with the theory of
Porter (1990, 2000) that says, among other things, that shortcomings of factor conditions
(such as labour shortage and high wages, and scarce natural resources) can actually
trigger technological and institutional innovations that will in the long term contribute
to the competitive success of firms in a specific location. 
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39 At an even closer look it turns out that sweet peppers, tomatoes, and cucumbers have
followed a different development path in terms of production, floor productivity, and
acreage  over  the  last  two  decades  (table  1).  Sweet  peppers  have  shown  an  almost
explosive growth rate over the last two decades (+933 %) and have become the booming
Dutch vegetable. 
 
Table 1. Production, land productivity, and acreage of sweet peppers, tomatoes and cucumbers,
1980-2002.
 Production Land productivity Acreage
 (millions of kilograms) (kilograms per m²) (hectares)
 1980 2002  1980 2002  1980 2002  
Sweet Peppers 30 310 +933% 14 25 +79% 214 1235 +477%
Tomatoes 381 560 +47% 17.5 45 +157% 2167 1225 -43%
Cucumbers 299 433 +45% 40 65 +63% 746 658 -12%
Sources : Kwantitatieve Informatie voor de Glastuinbouw, 1983-1984, 2001-2002, and CBS,
Landbouwtelling.
40 No doubt that this extremely high growth rate has much to do with the introduction of
new product varieties, the most recent of which are the orange sweet pepper, Turkish
sweet  peppers  in  various  colours,  and  the  more  tasty  mini-sweet-pepper  that  is
expected to become successful as a snack. But it is doubtful whether the export growth
of Dutch sweet peppers is the result of their exceptionally good taste.
41 “Carlo Petrini, the founding father of Slow Food, said on a meeting in Amsterdam that
he had discovered that the taste of peperonata in one of his favourite restaurants in his
homeland  Italy  had  changed  and  was  less  good.  He  found  out  that  the  dish  was
prepared with Dutch sweet peppers instead of Italian ones. And the English master chef
Rick  Stein  did  in  television  series  French  Odyssee  some shopping  on  French  small
markets. He was irritated by the Dutch sweet peppers of the same form and said : ”If
the  Dutch would grow in  their  glasshouses  sweet  peppers  that  look less  well,  they
would sell much more of them“ (Scheepmaker, 2006, p. 20). 
42 One should  expect  that  the  extremely  high production growth of  sweet  peppers  is
correlated  with an  extremely  high  growth  in  land  productivity.  According  to
”Verdoorn’s law“, a high growth rate of productivity of industries is accompanied with
a high growth rate of output. The causality can run in both ways. Economies of scale
and/or  process  innovations  lead  to  lower  prices  and  higher  output  while  a  higher
output results in economies of scale and/or process innovations. But, as table 1 shows,
the extremely high production growth of sweet peppers is not accompanied with an
extremely high growth of land productivity (although still very high). Tomatoes, not
sweet peppers, show by far the highest growth of land productivity (+157 %). The very
high growth of land productivity of tomatoes is partly related to their quality. Until the
early 1990s, Dutch tomato industry was dominated by a fordist-like mass production of
low-quality tomatoes with a low content of fructose that were not very appetising. In
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the 1980s, the Germans began to complain about the low quality of Dutch tomatoes –
they  unflatteringly  called  them  ”Wasserbomben“  (water  bombs)  –  and  have
increasingly  switched to  tomatoes  from Spain that  became an EU-member in  1986.
Dutch  growers  and  seed  improvement  companies  have  responded  to  Spanish
competition by introducing new varieties such as the Cherries, Romas, Tasty-Toms, Red
Pearls, Tominas, and recently the Santessa that are said (but not scientifically proven)
to be healthy due to  their  high level  of  lycopeen.  Although the share of  the latter
varieties is quickly growing, the production of low-quality tomatoes still  dominates.
The  different  growth  rates  of  production  and  land  productivity  explain  the  huge
differences  in  land-use  change  of  sweet  peppers,  tomatoes,  and  cucumbers.  In  the
period  1980-2002,  the  number  of  square  meters  of  greenhouses  allocated  to  sweet
peppers increased with 477 percent while that allocated to tomatoes and cucumbers
declined with 43 percent and 12 percent respectively (table 1).
43 The  bulk  of  tomatoes,  sweet  peppers,  and  cucumbers  are  produced  in  only  a  few
regions. Dutch greenhouse horticulture originated in the Westland region, south of The
Hague and west of Rotterdam, which still is its core area3.  Over the last twenty-five
years, however, it has spread to other regions fueled by increasing internal economies
of scale – the average size of vegetables-under-glass firms has been doubled over the
last twenty five years – and limited opportunities for extending the greenhouse area in
the highly urbanised southern wing of the Randstad. By far the largest majority of the
vegetables-under-glass  production  has  been  spilled  over  to  the  nearby  province  of
Noord-Brabant and the somewhat more distantly situated region of north Limburg. The
share of other regions has only slightly increased. Nowadays, more than two-third of all
tomatoes, sweet peppers, and cucumbers are produced in the Westland region, Noord-
Brabant and the north of Limburg (table 2). Thus the deconcentration out of Westland
core-area  seems  to  have  resulted  in  a  reconcentration at  a  larger  spatial  scale.  The
vegetables-under-glass  cluster  no  longer  coincides  with  one  labour-market  area  or
daily ”urban“ system but encompasses many of them nowadays. 
 
Table 2. Regional Share of Greenhouse Area for Sweet Peppers, Tomatoes, and Cucumbers.
 Sweet peppers Tomatoes Cucumbers
 1980 ( %) 2002 ( %) 1980 ( %) 2002 ( %) 1980 ( %) 2002 ( %)
Westland region* 83.6 61.1 73.3 59.7 51.6 26.9
Noord-Brabant 5.5 13.8 11.3 19.7 13.2 24.9
North Limburg 1.0 11.3 5.8 9.8 6.8 17.9
Rest of Netherlands 9.9 13.8 9.6 10.2 28.4 30.3
Netherlands 100 100 100 100 100 100
*including the regions Groot-Rijnmond and the Hague
Source : CBS, Landbouwtelling, 2004.
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Innovation by poly-scalar networks
44 The strong export performance of the vegetables-under-glass cluster is obviously based
on (incremental)  innovations,  as  the extremely high land productivity and the new
product innovations indicate. Yet, a couple of factors that are very often discussed in
the above-mentioned literature on new economic regionalism do not play a role at all
in  its  innovativeness.  The  cluster’s  innovativeness  is  neither  based  on  a  strong
employer-employee interdependence nor on pools of specialized labour.  The typical
vegetables-under-glass firm, directly controlled by its owner, employs only few lowly
skilled workers that fulfill standardized tasks only. And many workers are recruited on
a temporary and sometimes illegal basis. Nor is the cluster’s innovativeness based on a
”critical home market“ that plays such an important role in Porter’s theory (Porter,
1990 and 2000). As mentioned before, the introduction of new varieties in the tomato
industry was not induced by a critical home market but by a critical export market. 
45 While the vegetables-under-glass firms are spatially fairly concentrated, the picture
changes somewhat when we look at their most important suppliers being of crucial
importance  to  their  innovativeness,  i.e.  glasshouse-constructing  firms  and  seed-
improvement  companies.  Two-third  of  all  Dutch  glasshouse-constructing  firms  are
located in or near the Westland area (see www.avag.nl). These firms do not only supply
glasshouses  to  growers  of  vegetables  but  also  to  growers  of  flowers  that  are
concentrated elsewhere, namely south of Amsterdam. Dutch glasshouse-constructing
firms are very innovative in energy technology and CO2 regulation among others, and
export their products worldwide.  The highly innovative seed-improvement industry
made up of a few Dutch and foreign multinationals, however, is much more scattered
over the country.
46 Although the  vegetables-under-glass  cluster  is  in  horizontal  terms  and,  to  a  lesser
extent,  in  vertical  terms spatially  fairly  concentrated,  the scaling of  the regulatory
framework of the cluster is quite different. The formal institutions are national while
informal collaboration between growers is local, i.e. within their daily ”urban“ systems.
47 The Dutch vegetables-under-glass cluster is formally organized along vertical lines in
the  ”Produktschap  Tuinbouw“  (Horticultural  Statutory  Trade  Association)  that
encompasses all firms that are involved in producing and selling of vegetables, fruit
and  flowers.  The  ”Produktschap“,  which  has  a  semi-public  status,  represents  and
regulates the interests of the whole ”filière“,  and is governed by representatives of
employers  associations  and  trade  unions.  Its  main  activities  are  product  quality
control, horticultural research (until recently it had its own breeding stations but they
have  become  independent  organizations  that  are  nowadays  associated  with  the
University of  Wageningen),  market research,  export promotion,  vocational  training,
and  implementation  of  environmental  rules.  Until  1995,  the  vegetables-under-glass
growers  were  horizontally  organized  in  the  horticultural  section  of  the
”Landbouwschap“ (Agricultural Board), which had the same semi-public status as the
”Produktschap“.  But  the  ”Landbouwschap“  has  been  transformed  into  the  private
association  LTO-Nederland.  Since  then,  the  majority  of  the  vegetables-under-glass
growers are organized in the latter and, more in particular, in two of its departments,
namely LTO-Glastuinbouw (LTO-Horticulture under Glass) and LTO-Groeiservice (LTO-
Growth  Service).  The  latter  is  specialized  in  the  dissemination  of  horticultural
knowledge  and  the  diffusion  of  horticultural  innovations.  Both  LTO-Nederland  and
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LTO-Groeiservice  have  regional  sections  in  the  north,  east,  south,  and  west  of  the
country. 
48 The above-mentioned formal organizations are by tradition meso-corporatist  based.
We speak of meso-corporatism if state agencies negotiate policies with organizations
that have achieved monopoly representation of their specific sectoral interests,  and
have  got  some  form  of  public  authority  in  order  to  implement  these  policies  (see
Cawson, 1986, pp. 106-118). These meso-corporatist organizations are part of the wider
national corporatist  framework, which is  a key characteristic of  the Dutch business
system and is broadly and deeply rooted in Dutch history, particularly in the Dutch
tradition  of  pillarisation  (Van  Waarden,  2002  and  2003).  That  is  why  the  formal
institutions of the vegetables-under-glass cluster are national.
49 Apart from these modes of cooperation, growers of vegetables also formally cooperate
in other ways. Many (but not all) growers of vegetables are members of the auctions,
such as the Greenery, that are organized on a cooperative basis. And over the last ten
years,  smaller  growers  of  vegetables  have  set  up  associations  (so-called
”telersverenigingen“) to sell their products collectively out of the reach of auction. 
50 Vegetables-under-glass growers do not only cooperate on a formal basis at the national
level but also on a more or less informal basis at the local level. Growers of the same
crop are locally organized in so-called excursion groups that are made up of five to ten
members who meet each other very regularly (Oerlemans et al., 1997 ; Boogaard, 2002,
pp. 64-74). The Westland region has by far the highest density of ”vegetables excursion
groups“ followed by Noord-Brabant and northern Limburg and, at a large distance, by
the rest of the Netherlands. Due to its high density of excursion groups, growers in the
Westland region can much more easily find an excursion group close by than growers
elsewhere. This is the more so because growers prefer to meet other growers that do
not just  produce the same crop but the same crop of  the same variety.  In such an
excursion  group  growers  discuss  a  wide  range  of  issues  that  have  to  do  with  the
production  and  innovation  of  their  vegetables.  And  they  exchange  detailed  data
regarding  the  glasshouse  climate,  labour-  and  energy-costs,  the  amount  of  used
artificial fertilizer, and output per square meter. In short, they exchange information
that  firms  in  other  sectors  would  keep  secret.  The  open  attitude  of  members  of
excursion groups is confirmed in interviews with growers of sweet peppers (Boogaard,
2002, pp. 64-74) and with growers of flowers (Alles, 1998, pp. 48-51) who cooperate in
exactly the same way. They all emphasize that information circulates openly and no
one has the feeling that it is abused. Growers do trust each other because they meet
very regularly and, particularly in the Westland region, usually know each other in
other roles than as a grower (as a member of a sport club, for instance). Thus their trust
is, to a large extent, non-rational in origin. But it is beyond doubt also based partly on a
rational strategy (cf. Farrell and Knight, 2003). Interviewed growers stress that they all
are better off with cooperation than without, notwithstanding the fact that they are
simultaneously  competitors  (”It  is  only  through  cooperation  that  we  can  remain
competitive on global markets“). And they do realize that whoever breaks the rules of
the game is excluded from the excursion group. The view that they all are better off
with cooperation than without has certainly to do with the fact that the size of the
firms,  and therefore  the  power  relations,  are  more  or  less  equal.  Things  would  be
different if large firms would have to cooperate with small ones. 
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51 Tacit knowledge does not only circulate locally in excursion groups but also at larger
spatial scale (the north, east, south, and west of the country) in so-called study clubs.
Representatives of local excursion groups meet in study clubs in the same region to
exchange information discussed in excursion groups. Representatives of these study
groups, in turn, meet in a national meeting where the results of regional study clubs
are compared (Oerlemans et al., 1997). It goes without saying that the themes discussed
at national meetings filter down to the regional and local level. Thus tacit knowledge
circulates across various scales. The circulation of tacit knowledge is intertwined with
the nationally circulating codified knowledge. Members of excursion groups and study
clubs discuss and interpret messages and articles that are published in the horticultural
press and on the websites of the ”Productschap Tuinbouw“ and LTO-Nederland. In the
literature  codified  and  tacit  knowledge  are  very  often  interpreted  as  forms  of
knowledge that have nothing to do with each other. But, as Howells (2000, p. 53) rightly
argues,  both  forms  of  knowledge  are  never  divided  because  codified  knowledge
requires  tacit  knowledge  for  its  interpretation.  The  specific  way  in  which  tacit
knowledge circulates across scales and is interwoven with the national circulation of
codified knowledge is a key feature of the scaling of the vegetables-under-glass cluster. 
52 Formal  and  informal  cooperation  has  become  intertwined  in  other  ways  too.  Both
excursion  groups  and  study  clubs  initially  were  part  of  the  separate  umbrella
organization  ”Nederlandse  Vereniging  van  Tuinbouw  Studiegroepen“  (Dutch
Federation of Horticultural Sudy Groups) but the latter organization has been merged
with  ”LTO-Groeiservice“  in  the  late  1990s.  In  addition,  we  have  seen  that  the
vegetables-under-glass cluster has deconcentrated from the Westland region to mainly
Noord-Brabant and northern Limburg and that there is density gradient of excursion
groups (high in the Westland region and low in the rest of the Netherlands), which
implies that it is more difficult for growers outside the Westland region to find other
growers nearby who produce the same crop of the same variety. The regional sections
of  ”LTO-Groeiservice“  very  often  take  the  initiative  to  organize  excursion  groups
outside the Westland region (Boogaard, 2002, p. 68). 
53 Are growers in the Westland region,  the core of  the vegetables-under-glass cluster,
more innovative than outsiders ? Malmberg and Maskell (2002, p. 435) rightly point out
in their critical discussion of the concept of localisation economies that there is not
many research available that compares clustered firms with non-clustered firms that
operating in the same market (but see Appold, 1995 and Swann et al., 1998). Boogaard
has  compared  the  land  productivity  of  a  sample  of  sweet-pepper  growers  in  the
Westland region with those outside (including the rest of the Netherlands). As table 3
shows,  land  productivity  in  the  Westland  region  is  not  higher  than  elsewhere.
Interviewed sweet-pepper growers confirm that one does not have to be located in the
Westland  region  to  be  innovative  because  specialized  knowledge  is  diffused  very
quickly all over the country (Boogaard, 2002, pp. 84-86). This is in line with research
done by the LEI (2001) that shows that the vegetables-under-glass firms are no longer
more cost-effective than those the rest of the Netherlands. 
 
Table 3. Land Productivity of Red, Yellow and Green Sweet Peppers (kg per m²).
 Westland Region Outside Westland Region
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Source : Boogaard, 2002, p. 86.
 
Conclusion
54 We have seen that in the literature on clusters the attention how clusters are scaled has
grown over the last six or seven years. This has particularly to do with new conceptions
of scale and scaling in geography as well as with the importance of external, i.e. global,
relations for well-functioning clusters. All this is in line with the glocalisation thesis.
However, there is an important strain of literature that is in conflict with the latter,
namely the variety-of-capitalism thesis that stresses a persistent continuity of various
national  forms of  capitalism.  This  is  so  because  there  is  a  strong complementarity
between  national  institutions  that  creates  a  comparative  advantage  for  specific
economic activities. The variety-of-capitalism thesis is weak in two respects, namely (i)
on change (it is more focused on continuity than change) and (ii) how business systems
are scaled (it is too much focused at the national level). In this paper I tried to bridge
cluster literature and the variety-of-capitalism literature in order to explore how and
to what extent clusters are integrated with national forms of capitalism and, therefore,
are shaped by the latter. My major conclusion is that there is a lot of variety within
variety of capitalisms at the national level. The same applies to the degree clusters are
integrated with the national level. In other words, there is a lot of variety of horizontal
institutional complementarity at the national level as well as of vertical institutional
complementarity,  that  is  the  degree  at  which clusters  are  integrated with national
business systems. 
55 The case of the Dutch vegetables-under-glass cluster is an example of a cluster that is
strongly  integrated  with  the  specific  national  form  of  Dutch  capitalism.  The  fairly
strong regional concentration of that cluster suggests that the clue to its strong export
performance has to be found in the region. The region does, indeed, play an important
role in the global competitiveness of the cluster but at a lower spatial scale. As we have
seen, the informal cooperation of growers in excursion groups at the local level is very
important for its innovativeness. But the embeddedness of the cluster in the Westland
region has  not  been so  strong  that  it  has  become ”locked in“  and has  blocked its
deconcentration. Indeed, the spread out of the Westland region has kept the cluster in
good  shape.  In  terms  of  productivity  per  square  meter,  growers  of  sweet  peppers
outside the Westland region are as innovative as those inside. The major reason why
the cluster is not so strongly locally embedded is that it organized along functional
lines at the national level rather than along territorial lines. The cluster is by tradition
organized  on  a  meso-corporatist  basis  and  tightly  interwoven  with  the  wider
corporatist  framework that  is  a  key  feature  of  the  Dutch business  system.  But  the
formal institutions at the national level and the informal ones at the local level should
not be interpreted in terms of what Brenner (2000, p. 364) calls a zero-sum conception
of scale referred to earlier,  i.e.  the notion that scales operate as mutually exclusive
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rather than as co-constitutive territorial frameworks for social relations. The informal
cooperation  of  growers  at  the  local  level  is  closely  intertwined  with  the  formal
cooperative institutions at the national level.
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NOTES
1. The  introduction  of  a  new  product  or  (2)  a  new  method  of  production,  (3)  the
opening of a new market, (4) the conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or
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half-manufactured goods, and (5) the carrying out of a new organisation of an industry,
like the creation of a monopoly position through, for example,  trustification or the
breaking up of a monopoly position.
2. The Balassa-index for industry j in country A is: 
export value industry j in A/total export value A
export value industry j group of reference countries/total export value for group of
reference countries.
3. Already in 1912 about eighty five percent of all Dutch vegetables under glass were
grown in the Westland area (Van Doesburg et al., 1999). 
ABSTRACTS
Economic geographers have become strongly focused on two scales over the last 25 years : the
local  and the  global.  That’s  why they  mostly  ignore  the  growing literature  on  the  so-called
variety  of  capitalism thesis  that,  contrary  to  what  the  glocalisation  thesis  claims,  stresses  a
persistent continuity of national forms of capitalism and national forms of the state in the era of
globalisation.  In  this  variety-of-capitalism  literature  the  concept  of  institutional
complementarity plays a key role. It means, among others, that one institution makes the other
more efficient (and vice versa). 
In  their  studies  on  clusters  economic  geographers  stress  a  strong  “horizontal”  institutional
complementarity at the local level (although they do not use that concept) but largely ignore a
“vertical”  complementarity  of  local  and  national  institutions.  Adherents  of  the  variety  of
capitalism thesis, on the other hand, stress a “horizontal” institutional complementarity at the
national level but, being blind to geography, ignore a “vertical” institutional complementarity
between the national and local level.
In this paper I aim to bridge both bodies of literature and to explore the “vertical” institutional
complementarity between national forms of capitalism and clusters. To give my arguments flesh
and blood, I explore how and why the Dutch vegetables-under-glass cluster is interwoven with
the national corporatist institutions, which is a key characteristic of the Dutch form of capitalism
and state form. 
Au cours de ces 25 dernières années, les géographes économistes se sont fortement focalisés sur
deux  échelles :  locale  et  globale.  Ainsi  se  détournent-ils  de  la  littérature  de  plus  en  plus
abondante consacrée à la thèse de la variété du capitalisme qui, contrairement à ce que prétend
la thèse de la glocalisation, met l’accent sur une continuité persistante des formes nationales de
capitalisme et des formes nationales d’Etat à l’ère de la globalisation. Dans cette littérature sur la
variété  du  capitalisme,  le  concept  de  complémentarité  institutionnelle  joue  un  rôle  clé :  il
signifie, entre autres, qu’une institution renforce l’efficacité de l’autre (et inversement).
Dans  leurs  études  sur  les  clusters,  les  géographes  économistes  soulignent  une  forte
complémentarité  institutionnelle  “horizontale”  au  niveau  local  (bien  qu’ils  n’utilisent  pas  ce
concept), mais ignorent largement une complémentarité “verticale” entre institutions nationales
et  locales.  Les  partisans  de  la  thèse  de  la  variété  du capitalisme soulignent  par  ailleurs  une
complémentarité  institutionnelle  “horizontale”  au  niveau  national,  mais,  étant  aveugles  à  la
géographie, ignorent une complémentarité institutionnelle “verticale” entre niveaux national et
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local.
Dans  cet  article, je  tente  de  rapprocher  ces  deux  corpus  littéraires  et  d’explorer  la
complémentarité institutionnelle “verticale” entre formes nationales de capitalisme et clusters.
Afin de donner du poids à mes arguments, j’examine comment et pourquoi le cluster néerlandais
de la culture des légumes sous verre est lié avec les institutions corporatistes nationales, une
caractéristique clé de la forme de capitalisme et de la forme d’Etat propres aux Pays-Bas.
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